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Abstract
This paper reformulates and simplies a recent model by Heidhues and Koszegi
(2005), which in turn is based on a behavioral model due to Koszegi and Rabin
(2006). The model analyzes optimal pricing when consumers are loss averse in
the sense that an unexpected price hike lowers their willingness to pay. The main
message of the Heidhues-Koszegi model, namely that this form of consumer loss
aversion leads to rigid price responses to cost uctuations, carries over. I demon-
strate the usefulness of this cover versionof the Heidhues-Koszegi-Rabin model
by obtaining new results: (1) loss aversion lowers expected prices; (2) the rms
incentive to adopt a rigid pricing strategy is stronger when uctuations are in
demand rather than in costs.
1 Introduction
Like other creative artists, economic theorists value originality. When we construct
a model of a certain economic phenomenon, we try to distance and di¤erentiate our
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personal creation from previous work, unless we wish to present it as an extension,
application or foundation of an existing model. However, there is also value in a
di¤erent sort of exercise, in which the theorist takes an existing model and tries to
rewrite it from scratch. When playing this game, the economic theorist steps into the
shoes of another theorist, takes her economic motivation and basic modelling idea as
given, but then tries to do it his way. The result of such a re-modelling exercise
can be viewed as a cover versionof the original model. It is not an entirely new
creation, because it is a deliberate and explicit variant on an existing model. However,
it is also not entirely derivative, because the variant is often su¢ ciently di¤erent to
merit separate attention. By o¤ering a di¤erent way of formalizing the same economic
phenomenon, the cover version contributes to our understanding of the phenomenon.
Furthermore, the cover version may be technically easier to apply in certain domains,
in which case it expands the original models scope of applications.
This paper proposes a cover versionof a recent model of optimal pricing when
consumers are loss averse, due to Heidhues and K½oszegi (2005) - which in turn builds
on a behavioral model proposed by K½oszegi and Rabin (2006). These two papers are
referred to as HK and KR in the sequel, and the model in its totality is referred to
as HKR. The motivation behind the model is an idea of long standing: consumers are
antagonized by unexpected price hikes, and this may cause rms to be cautious when
adapting prices to demand or cost shocks. (See Hall and Fitch (1939), Okun (1981)
and Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1986).) In other words, consumersdistaste for
unpleasant price surprises acts as a menu costthat deters rms from changing prices
in response to exogenous shocks. Similar claims have been made in relation to wage
rigidity in labor markets (see Fehr, Goette and Zehnder (2009)).
The HKR model formalizes this idea. The distaste for unexpected price hikes
is viewed as a manifestation of loss aversion (as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979)):
unpleasant price surprises are perceived as a loss relative to the price the consumer
expected, which acts as his reference point. HK apply the model of loss aversion
preferences with expectations-driven reference points proposed by KR, and analyze
optimal monopoly pricing when consumers behave according to this model.1
I present a variation on the HKR model of optimal pricing when consumers are
averse to unpleasant price surprises. I borrow the economic motivation as well as
the main modelling idea from HKR, and do not claim any originality in this regard.
1Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) and Karle and Peitz (2008) extend this analysis to oligopolistic
settings. For a eld study which is skeptical of price-variation antagonism, see Courty and Pagliero
(2009).
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However, I depart from the HKR model in several dimensions. Although the concept
of loss aversion has been backed up by decades of experimental research, to turn it into
a workable economic model the theorist has to make crucial modelling choices that
themselves lack experimental support. Specically, any model of loss-averse consumers
with expectations-driven reference points has to address the following questions:
1. Which aspects of the market outcome are evaluated as gains or losses relative to
a reference point?
2. Does the consumers expectation regarding his own consumption decision enter
the specication of the reference point?2
3. When the reference point is stochastic, how should we sum overall the possible
values it can get?
My variation on the HKR model departs from the original model in all three di-
mensions - mostly in the direction of simplifying it. First, while HKR assume that
loss aversion a¤ects the consumers evaluation of both the price paid and the quantity
consumed, I allow only the former. Second, while HKR assume that the reference
point incorporates the consumers expectation regarding his own action, I assume that
only his expectation regarding the price that the rm charges determines his reference
point. Finally, HKR assume that the consumer computes his expected utility from a
given action for every possible reference point, and integrates over all reference points
to obtain an evaluation of the action. In contrast, I assume that the consumer has a
single reference point in mind, but this reference point is drawn from the price distrib-
ution that characterizes the market. In other words, while HKR sum overreference
points at the utility level, I do so at the demand level.
I reproduce the main insights in HKR. Optimal prices are rigid in two respects.
First, the price range is cramped relative to the benchmark without loss aversion:
mark-ups are higher in low-cost states and lower in high-cost states. Second, prices
can be sticky in the sense of not responding at all to small cost shocks. (I devote a
lot less space to this e¤ect than HKR.) I then proceed to demonstrate the usefulness
of the reformulated model with a pair of new results. First, I show that the expected
price that rms charge is weakly lower than in the benchmark without loss aversion.
However, this e¤ect is not monotone with respect to the magnitude of consumersloss
2As we shall see, this question is relevant even if the consumers actual consumption is not evaluated
in terms of gains or losses relative to a reference point.
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aversion. Second, I show that the price rigidity e¤ect is stronger in some sense when
shocks are in demand rather than in costs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I present the model.
Section 3 provides a partial characterization of optimal pricing strategies and demon-
strates price rigidity e¤ects. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the new results: the
impact of loss aversion on expected prices, and the di¤erence between cost and de-
mand shocks. For expositional clarity, the detailed comparison with the original HKR
model is deferred to Section 6.
2 The Model
A monopolistic rm sells a single unit of a product to a continuum of measure one
of consumers. The rms marginal cost c is distributed uniformly over some set of
possible values C. Suppose for now that C is nite. Denote jCj = m > 1. Let ch and
cl denote the highest and lowest cost values in C, 1 > ch > cl > 0. Let c denote the
average cost in C. The rm commits to a deterministic pricing strategy P : C ! R,
where P (c) is the price the monopolist charges when the marginal cost is c. Note that
because of the randomness of the rms marginal cost, its pricing strategy induce a
probability measure P over stated prices, where
P (x) =
jfc 2 C j P (c) = xgj
m
The consumerschoice model is as follows. Each consumer rst draws a cost state
ce from the uniform distribution over C, and sets his reference price to be pe = P (ce).
Thus, the reference point is essentially drawn from P . The consumer buys the product
if and only if the actual price p satises p  u   L(p; pe), where u is the consumers
rawwillingness to pay for the product, and L is a loss function that satises several
properties: (i) it weakly increases with p and weakly decreases with pe; (ii) L(p; pe) = 0
whenever p  pe. This structure of L captures the loss-aversion aspect of consumer
behavior: consumers react to unpleasant price surprises with a reduced willingness to
pay, while pleasant price surprises do not change their willingness to pay. The raw
willingness to pay u is distributed uniformly - and independently of the reference point
- over [0; 1].
The assumption that pe is randomly drawn from P requires justication. Clearly,
there are many other ways to model the formation of the reference points. For instance,
one could assume that the expected price according to P is the consumers reference
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point. The interpretation of sampling-based reference point formation is that the
consumer creates his expectations on the basis of a random past market experience
(his own or via word of mouth). Since this is one of the main departures from HKR,
it will be discussed further in Section 6.
Sampling-based reference point formation implies that consumers can di¤er in
two dimensions. First, they have di¤erent rawwillingness to pay u for the product.
Second, they have di¤erent market experiences that lead to di¤erent reference prices.
Thus, the sampling-basedformation of reference points enriches our conception of a
consumers type; moreover, it means that the rm can inuence, through its pricing
decision, the distribution of consumer types.
The monopolists maximization problem can be written as a discrete optimal control
problem. The rm chooses the function P to maximize
(P ) =
1
m2

X
c
X
c0
[P (c)  c] max[0; 1  P (c)  L(P (c); P (c0))] (1)
To see why this is the objective function, note that for each realization of the marginal
cost c, the rm is uncertain about the consumers willingness to pay. Since his raw
willingness to pay u is distributed uniformly over [0; 1], in the absence of loss aversion
(i.e., if L always takes the value zero) the probability that the consumer buys the
product at a price P (c) is 1   P (c). However, if the consumers expected price is
P (c0) < P (c), the probability he will buy the product at P (c) drops to max[0; 1  
P (c)   L(P (c); P (c0))]. Since the reference price P (c0) is drawn from P , we need to
sum over all possible values of c0.
When L always gets the value zero, the optimal pricing strategy is
P 0(c) =
1 + c
2
(2)
for every c 2 C. In comparison, if the rm were restricted to charging a constant price
for all cost values, the optimal price would be
p =
1 + c
2
(3)
In the presence of loss aversion, consumer demand is a function of the price dis-
tribution induced by the rms strategy. Specically, given a pricing strategy P , the
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probability that the consumer buys the rms product at a price p is
DP (p) =
1
m
X
c0
max[0; 1  p  L(p; P (c0))] (4)
Thus, consumer demand depends on the price distribution as a whole. When the
rm changes its price in one cost state, this a¤ects (probabilistically) the consumers
reference point, hence consumer demand at other prices. In this sense, local prices
changes have a global e¤ect on consumer demand. When we hold P xed, DP decreases
with p, as usual. Note that as long as P (c) < 1 for all c, DP [P (c)] > 0 for all c. The
reason is simple: when P (c) < 1, rawwillingness to pay exceeds P (c) with positive
probability, and the reference price is equal to P (c) (or higher) with positive probability.
3 Price Rigidity
In this section I begin characterizing optimal pricing strategies. The rst main result
is preceded by a pair of lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let P be an optimal pricing strategy. Then, for every c 2 C, P (c) < 1 and
consumer demand (given by (4)) is strictly positive at P (c).
Proof. Let P be an optimal pricing strategy. Let us rst show that P (c) < 1 for
all c 2 C. Assume, contrary to this claim, that P (c)  1 for some c 2 C. Then,
consumer demand is zero at P (c). Suppose that the rm deviates to a pricing strategy
P 0 such that P 0(c) = 1   ", where " > 0 is arbitrarily small, and P 0(c) = P (c) for
all c 6= c. Following the deviation, consumer demand at P 0(c) is strictly positive,
because 1  P 0(c)  L(P 0(c); P 0(c)) = " > 0. Furthermore, for every c 6= c,
max[0; 1  P 0(c)  L(P 0(c); P 0(c))] = max[0; 1  P (c)  L(P (c); P (c))]
hence the deviation does not change consumer demand at any c 6= c. It follows that
the deviation is protable. Then, for every c 2 C, P (c) < 1. Since L(P (c); P (c)) = 0,
consumer demand is strictly positive at P (c).
The intuition for the result that aggregate consumer demand is always strictly
positive is simple: for every price realization, there is positive probability that an
individual consumers reference price is weakly higher. Thus, any optimal pricing
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strategy P has the property that DP [P (c)] > 0 for all c. The next lemma relies on this
result.
Lemma 2 Every optimal pricing strategy P is weakly increasing in c and satises
P (c)  c for every c 2 C.
Proof. Let P be an optimal pricing strategy. Suppose that c1 > c2 and yet P (c2) >
P (c1). Denote P (c1) = p1 and P (c2) = p2. Suppose that the rm switches to a pricing
strategy P 0 that coincides with P for all c 6= c1; c2, and P 0(c1) = p2, P 0(c2) = p1. The
change in the rms objective function as a result of the deviation is
1
m
X
c
[(P 0(c)  c) DP 0(P 0(c))  (P (c)  c) DP (P (c))]
The deviation has the property that it does not alter the induced price distribution.
That is, P = P 0. Therefore, the deviation does not change consumer demand:
DP 0(x) = DP (x) for every price x. Accordingly, let us omit the subscript of the
demand function. We can thus rewrite the above expression as follows:
1
m
X
c
f[P 0(c)  c]D(P 0(c))  [P (c)  c]D(P (c))g
Since P and P 0 coincide over c 6= c1; c2, this expression is strictly positive if and
only if
[p2   c1]D(p2)  [p1   c1]D(p1) + [p1   c2]D(p1)  [p2   c2]D(p2) > 0
which simplies into
(c2   c1)(D(p2) D(p1)) > 0
Recall that by assumption, c1 > c2 and p2 > p1. Since D is strictly decreasing in
the range in which it is strictly positive, and since we have established in the previous
lemma that D(P (c)) > 0 for all c 2 C, the inequality holds. Therefore, the deviation
to P 0 is strictly protable.
Let C = fc 2 C j P (c) < cg. Suppose that C is non-empty. Consider a deviation
to a pricing strategy P 0 that satises P 0(c) = c for all c 2 C and P 0(c) = P (c) for
all c =2 C. For every c 2 C, the rms prot conditional on being chosen ceases
to be strictly negative as a result of the deviation. For every c =2 C, the deviation
weakly lowers the loss aversion term because it raises the consumersreference price
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with positive probability. Since we have established that consumer demand is strictly
positive at all cost states, the deviation is strictly protable. Therefore, C must be
empty.
In the absence of loss aversion, this result followed trivially from (2). In the presence
of loss aversion, it is a non-trivial result because in general, the rms pricing strategy
inuences consumer demand. However, when the rm deviates to a pricing strategy
that does not change the overall price distribution, consumer demand is una¤ected.
The proof is based on this type of deviation and thus demonstrates the tractability of
sampling-basedreference point formation.
We are now ready to prove our rst main result. When the consumer is loss averse,
the rm raises the price at the lowest level of marginal cost and lowers the price at the
highest level of marginal cost, relative to the benchmark with no loss aversion. This
crampedprice range can be viewed as an instance of price rigidity. The rm does
not want the consumer to experience large losses that will reduce his willingness to
pay, and therefore shrinks the price range.
Proposition 1 Let P be an optimal pricing strategy P . Then:
P 0(cl)  P (cl)  P (ch)  P 0(ch)
Proof. Let P be an optimal pricing strategy. By Lemma 2, P is weakly increasing
and satises P (c)  c for every c 2 C, hence P (ch)  P (cl)  cl and P (ch)  ch.
(i) P 0(cl)  P (cl). Recall that P 0(cl) = 1
2
(1 + cl). In the absence of loss aversion,
the hump shape of the rms objective function implies that for every c  cl, the price
P 0(cl) yields a higher prot than any p0 < P 0(cl). Dene c0 to be the highest cost c for
which P (c) < 1
2
(1 + cl). Since P is weakly increasing, P (c) < 1
2
(1 + cl) for all c  c0.
Suppose that the rm deviates to a pricing strategy P 0 that satises P 0(c) = 1
2
(1 + cl)
for c  c0 and coincides with P for c > c0. The bare prot excluding the loss
aversion term goes up. As to the loss aversion component, because P 0 is at over
c  c0, L(P 0(c1); P 0(c2)) = 0 whenever c1; c2  c0. Moreover, because P 0(c) > P (c)
for c  c0 and P 0(c) = P (c) for c > c0, L(P 0(c1); P 0(c2))  L(P (c1); P (c2)) whenever
c2  c0 < c1. Since P and P 0 coincide at all c > c0, L(P 0(c1); P 0(c2)) = L(P (c1); P (c2))
when c1; c2 > c0. Finally, when c1  c0 < c2, L(P 0(c1); P 0(c2)) = 0 because by the
denitions of c0 and P 0, P 0(c2) > P 0(c1). It follows that the deviation is protable.
(ii) P (ch)  P 0(ch). Consider two cases. First, suppose that P is at - i.e.,
P (cl) = P (ch) = p. We have seen that in this case, the optimal price p is given by (3),
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which is strictly below 1
2
(1 + ch). Second, suppose that P (cl) < P (ch) = ph. Let C
be the set of cost values c for which P (c) = P (ch) = ph. Since P is weakly increasing
in c, there exists c 2 C such that C = fc 2 C j c > cg. By (4), consumer demand
at p given P is strictly lower than 1  p for every p > pl. Assume that ph > 1
2
(1 + ch).
Suppose that the rm switches to a pricing strategy P 0 such that P 0(c) = P (c) " for all
c 2 C and P 0(c) = P (c) for all c =2 C. If " > 0 is su¢ ciently small, P 0(c) > P 0(c0) for
every c 2 C, c0 =2 C. By the hump shape of the rms prot function in the absence
of loss aversion, this deviation strictly raises this bareprot in all states c 2 C. In
addition, the deviation weakly lowers the loss aversion term in those states, without
changing the loss aversion term in the states outside C. Therefore, the deviation is
strictly protable.
Thus, when the consumer is loss averse, the rm raises the price at the lowest level
of marginal cost and lowers the price at the highest level of marginal cost, relative
to the benchmark with no loss aversion. The rm does not want the consumer to
experience large losses that will reduce his willingness to pay, and therefore shrinks the
price range.
3.1 Maximal Flexibility vs. Maximal Rigidity: An Example
To get a better grasp of the forces that determine price rigidity, let us examine the
following example. Assume that L(p; pe) =  whenever p > pe, where  > 0 is an
exogenous parameter. This is an extreme case of loss aversion, in the sense that the
loss function is discontinuous at p = pe: the slightest price increase relative to the
consumers reference price generates a disutility. However, this disutility is insensi-
tive to the magnitude of the price increase. This special case lends itself to a clean
demonstration of the forces that inuence price rigidity.
Let us put aside the quest for an optimal pricing strategy, and instead compare
two extreme strategies: the optimal, fully exible pricing strategy in the absence of
loss aversion, denoted P 0 and given by (2), and the optimal fully rigid (i.e., constant)
price, given by (3). The latter eliminates the loss aversion term because it has no price
variation. When we calculate the loss in bareexpected prots (i.e., ignoring the loss
aversion term) as a result of switching from P 0 into the constant price p, we see that
it is
1
4
[(
1
m
X
c2C
c2)  (c)2]
which is proportional to the variance of c. On the other hand, by switching from P 0
9
into the optimal constant price p, the rm eliminates the expected loss due to loss
aversion. Since the probability of trade may be zero for some realizations of actual and
expected prices, this expected loss is bounded from above by
1
m2
X
c
X
c0<c
(P 0(c)  c)   = 1
m2
X
c
X
c0<c
(
1  c
2
)   <
1
m2
 1  c
2
 m(m  1)
2
  = (m  1)(1  c)  
4m
Holding the parameters m; c and  xed, we can see that whether the rm will prefer
P 0 or the optimal constant price p depends on the variance of c.
The insight from this comparison is that the rms incentive to introduce rigidity
into its pricing strategy depends on two aspects of cost uctuation: (i) the variance
of costs, which measures the global spread of uctuations; (ii) the number of cost
realizations, which captures the frequency of uctuations. When the rm experiences
a large number of small uctuations, it will tend towards a rigid pricing strategy because
the attempt to avoid antagonizing consumers will be the dominant consideration. On
the other hand, when uctuations are large and infrequent, the rm will tend towards
a exible pricing strategy, because the bare incentive to allow prices to respond to
cost shocks outweighs the incentive to minimize unpleasant surprises for consumers.
3.2 Price Stickiness
So far, I used the term price rigidityto describe a cramped range of prices compared
with the benchmark pricing strategy P 0. However, when economists discuss price
rigidity, they often have in mind a stickinessproperty - namely, lack of response to
small shocks. In order to be able to address this issue, we need to switch from a nite
set of cost values to a continuum. In this sub-section, I assume that c is drawn from
the uniform distribution over [0; 1]. The rms strategy is a function P : [0; 1] ! R,
and its objective function should be rewritten as follows:
(P ) =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[P (c)  c] max[0; 1  P (c)  L(P (c); P (c0))]dcdc0
All the results obtained in Section 3 for the nite case extend (subject to standard
modications) to the continuum case.
I now show that in the special case of extreme loss aversion, optimal pricing strate-
gies indeed display price stickiness, in the sense that prices do not always respond to
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small cost shocks.
Proposition 2 Let L(p; pe) =  whenever p > pe. Then, any optimal pricing strategy
is constant over some interval of cost values.
Proof. Assume the contrary. By Lemma 2, this means that there is an optimal pricing
strategy P that is strictly increasing over [0; 1]. Dene
p =
2 + "
4
for any " > 0. Suppose that the rm deviates to a strategy P 0 dened as follows:
P 0(c) =
(
p ; c < "
max[P (c); p] ; c  "
Note that P 0 is a weakly increasing function. Our objective is to show that if " is
su¢ ciently small, the deviation is protable.
Let us rst establish an upper bound on the loss in bareexpected prots caused
by the deviation. If P (c) < p for some c  ", then p is closer to P 0(c) = 1
2
(1 + c)
than P (c). By the hump shape of the rms bareprot function for any given c, it
follows that P 0(c) attains a weakly higher bareprot at c  " than P (c). Therefore,
the loss in bareexpected prots is bounded from above byZ "
0
f[P 0(c)  c]  [1  P 0(c)]  [p   c]  [1  p]dc
=
1
48
"3
Let us now turn to the e¤ect that the deviation has on the loss aversion term. By
the construction of P 0 and the denition of L, L(P 0(c); P 0(ce))  L(P (c); P (ce)) for all
c; ce. Since P is strictly increasing while P 0 is at over the interval [0; "), the reduction
in the loss aversion term as a result of the deviation is at leastZ "
0
Z "
c0
dcdc0 =
1
2
"2
Thus, if " is su¢ ciently small, the rms gain from curbing the loss aversion term
outweighs the loss in bareprots. Therefore, the deviation is protable.
The case of extreme loss aversion is relatively straightforward to analyze because
the loss aversion term only depends on whether the actual price exceeds the reference
11
price. When the magnitude of the price surprise also a¤ects the loss aversion term,
calculations become more complicated and require optimal-control techniques. I con-
jecture that the price stickiness result extends to any loss function that is very steep
for small price surprises and quickly becomes at.
4 Impact of Loss Aversion on Expected Prices
What is the e¤ect of loss aversion on the expected price that the monopolist charges
in optimum? To address this problem, let us consider a special case, in which C is
nite and L is only a function of  = p   pe. This is a common specication in
the literature (including HKR) due to its tractability. If the rm adopts a constant
function P (c) = p for all c, then by denition L is always zero. We saw that in this
case p = 1
2
(1+ c) - i.e., the expected price is exactly as in the benchmark with no loss
aversion.
For simplicity, assume that loss aversion is not too strong, in the following sense:
L(
1 + ch
2
;
1 + cl
2
) <
1  ch
2
(5)
Given Proposition 1, this restriction ensures that 1  P (c)  L(P (c); P (c0)) > 0 for all
c; c0 under any optimal pricing strategy P . In other words, consumer demand is strictly
positive conditional on any realization of actual and reference prices. The average price
that the rm charges under P is simply
1
jCj
X
c2C
P (c)
Proposition 3 Under every optimal strategy, the average price the rm charges is
weakly lower than p = 1
2
(1 + c).3
Proof. Let P be an optimal pricing strategy. If P is a constant function - i.e., P (c) = p
for all c - then we have seen that p = 1
2
(1+c). Assume that P is not a constant function.
Since it maximizes the rms expected prot, it satises the following inequality for
3This proof follows a suggestion by Ariel Rubinstein, which supplanted a previous proof based on
di¤erentiability assumption.
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every alternative strategy Q:X
c
X
c0
[P (c)  c] max[0; 1  P (c)  L(P (c); P (c0))]

X
c
X
c0
[Q(c)  c] max[0; 1 Q(c)  L(Q(c); Q(c0))]
DeneQ(c)  P (c) ", where " > 0 is arbitrarily small. Then, since L is only a function
of the di¤erence between the actual and expected price, the following inequality holds:X
c
X
c0
[P (c)  c] max[0; 1  P (c)  L(P (c); P (c0))]

X
c
X
c0
[P (c)  "  c] max[0; 1  P (c) + "  L(P (c); P (c0))]
Condition (5) ensures that 1  P (c) + "  L(P (c); P (c0)) > 0 for all c; c0. It follows
that we can rewrite the above inequality as follows:X
c
X
c0
f[P (c) c][1 P (c) L(P (c); P (c0))] [P (c) " c][1 P (c)+" L(P (c); P (c0))]g  0
This inequality is simplied into
2
X
c
X
c0
P (c) 
X
c
X
c0
[1 + c+ "  L(P (c); P (c0))]
Since P is not a constant function,
P
c
P
c0 L(P (c); P (c
0)) > 0. Therefore, if " is
su¢ ciently close to zero, we can write
2
X
c
X
c0
P (c) <
X
c
X
c0
[1 + c]
which immediately implies the result.
The rough intuition for this result is as follows. Since loss aversion diminishes
willingness to pay, the rm e¤ectively faces lower aggregate demand than in the absence
of loss aversion, and this is a force that impels the rm to lower its price on average.
Note that the average price does not decrease monotonically with the intensity of loss
aversion. When loss aversion is su¢ ciently strong, the rms optimal pricing strategy
is the constant price p given by (3), which is equal to the average price under P 0.
When condition (5) fails to hold, consumer demand is not necessarily positive under
every realization of reference and actual prices. In this case, I am able to prove a slightly
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modied version of Proposition 3: the average price conditional on consumer demand
being strictly positive is below p = 1
2
(1 + c). The proof of this result is similar to the
proof of Proposition 3 and therefore omitted, for the sake of brevity.
5 Cost vs. Demand Fluctuations
Throughout the paper, I have followed HKR by assuming that uctuations occur in
the cost dimension only. It is straightforward to extend the model by introducing
aggregate demand uctuations as well, and allowing the rm to condition its price on
both cost and demand shocks. Let 
 be a nite set consisting of m states. The rms
prior over 
 is uniform. Each state ! 2 
 is characterized by a cost-demand pair of
parameters (c!; v!), where v! > c for all !;  2 
. In state !, the measure of the
consumer population is v!, and the consumersrawwillingness to pay is uniformly
drawn from the interval [0; v!]. Thus, an increase in v corresponds to an upward shift
in the demand function faced by the monopolist. Let c and v denote the average values
of c and v across all states.
A pricing strategy is a function P : 
! R. The rms objective function is:
(P ) =
1
m2

X
!2

X
 2

[P (!)  c!] max[0; v!   P (!)  L(P (!); P ( ))]
In the benchmark without loss aversion (i.e., L  0), the rms optimal pricing strategy
is
P 0(!) =
v! + c!
2
The optimal constant price is
p =
v + c
2
Thus, in the absence of loss aversion, the optimal pricing strategy treats demand
and cost shocks symmetrically. This raises the question of whether this equal treatment
property carries over when consumers display loss aversion. In this section, I show that
the answer is negative. Moreover, the rms incentive to employ a rigid pricing strategy
is stronger in some sense when uctuations occur in the demand dimension.
5.1 A Two-State Example
Assume that there are two states of nature, l and h. Let vh  vl and ch  cl, with at
least one strict inequality. A pricing strategy is thus represented by a pair of prices
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(pl; ph), where p! = P (c!; v!). It can be shown (in the manner of Lemma 2) that any
optimal pricing strategy satises ph  pl. Since L(p; pe) = 0 whenever p  pe, the
objective function can be simplied into:
(pl   cl)max(0; vl   pl) + (ph   ch)[1
2
max(0; vh   ph) + 1
2
max(0; vh   ph   L(ph; pl))]
When loss aversion is su¢ ciently weak, consumer demand is guaranteed to be strictly
positive for all realizations of actual and reference prices, such that the objective func-
tion is further simplied into:
(pl   cl)(vl   pl) + (ph   ch)[vh   ph   1
2
L(ph; pl)]
Let us adopt the following specication of the loss function:
L(p; pe) =  +   (p  pe)
whenever p > pe. When  = 0, we are back with the case of extreme loss aversion
introduced in Sections 3.1-3.2. When  and  are su¢ ciently small, the solution to
the rms maximization problem, denoted (pl ; p

h), satises p

h > p

l and is given by
rst-order conditions:
@(pl ;p

h)
@pl
= vl + cl   2pl +

2
(ph   ch) = 0
@(pl ; p

h)
@ph
= vh + ch   2ph  

2
(ph   ch) 
1
2
[ +   (ph   pl )] = 0
leading to the solution:
pl =
1
8  2 + 16f[(8 + 4)(vl + cl) + 2(vh + ch)  ]  ch(4+ 
2)g
ph =
1
8  2 + 16f[8(vh + ch) + 2(vl + cl)  4] + ch(4  
2)g
These expressions allow us to compare two environments, A and B, that are iden-
tical in every respect except that in environment A uctuations are in costs whereas
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in environment B uctuations are in demand:
vAl = v
vAh = v
cAl = c  "
cAh = c+ "
vBl = v   "
vBh = v + "
cBl = c
cBh = c
Both environments share the same expected values of c and v. Moreover, vAl + c
A
l =
vBl + c
B
l = v+c  " and vAh + cAh = vBh + cBh = v+c+ ". When  > 0, in environment B,
ph is lower and p

l is higher than in environment A. In other words, the optimal pricing
strategy displays greater rigidity in environment B. Note, however, that if  = 0 - i.e.,
we are in the case of extreme loss aversion - this di¤erence disappears.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The loss aversion term is contributed by
the event in which the consumers reference price is pl and the actual price he faces
is ph. When the rm contemplates raising pl or lowering ph, it does so to curb the
loss aversion term. The mark-up in state h, ph   ch, is higher when uctuations are in
demand rather than in costs. Therefore, the rms gain from curbing the loss aversion
term and thus raising expected demand in state h is higher in environment B. As a
result, the rms incentive to narrow the price range is stronger in the case of demand
shocks.
5.2 Preference for a Fully Rigid Price
Let us now turn back to the case of an arbitrary number m of states, and compare two
environments, A and B, which are related to each other as follows. First, the state
space in both environments has the same cardinality m. Second, vA! + c
A
! = v
B
! + c
B
!
for every !. Third, cA = cB = c and vA = vB = v. Finally, vA! = v
A and cB! = c
B
across all !. Thus, the two environments are identical in every respect, except that in
environment A the uctuations are in costs whereas in environment B the uctuations
are in demand.
Our next result reveals a sense in which the incentive to employ rigid pricing strate-
gies is stronger under demand uctuations. We will say that a pricing strategy P is
regular if it satises two properties: (i) it weakly increases with c and v; (ii) it induces
strictly positive consumer demand for all realizations of actual and reference prices.
Proposition 4 If the rm prefers the optimal constant price to a regular pricing strat-
egy P in environment A, then it must have the same preference in environment B.
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Proof. The rms expected prot from the optimal constant price p is the same under
both environments. Thus, we only need to show that the rms expected prot from
an arbitrary regular pricing strategy P is higher in environment A than in environment
B. Since P is regular, we can rewrite its expected prot in each environment (omitting
the multiplicative term 1=m2) as follows:
(P ) =
X
!
[P (!)  c!][v!   P (!)] 
X
!
(P (!)  c!)
X
 
L(P (!); P ( ))
=
X
!
P (!)[v! + c!   P (!)] 
X
!
c!v!
 
X
!
X
 
P (!)  L(P (!); P ( )) +
X
!
X
 
c!  L(P (!); P ( ))
The rst term in the nal expression for (P ) is identical for both environments, by
the assumption that vA! + c
A
! = v
B
! + c
B
! for every !. The second term is identical for
both environments, by the assumption that cA = cB = c and vA = vB = v, coupled
with the assumption that vA! = v
A and cB! = c
B across all !. The third term is identical
for both environments because it is only a function of the pricing function and not of
underlying cost and demand parameters. It therefore remains to compare the fourth
term under both environments. Let us rewrite this fourth term as follows:X
!
c!L

! (6)
where
L! =
X
 
L(P (!); P ( ))
Order the states in 
 according to their v! + c! (which is the same in both envi-
ronments A and B). By assumption, P is weakly increasing in v! + c!. Therefore, L!
is also increasing in v! + c!. By assumption, both environments A and B share the
same
P
! c!, yet c
B
! = c for all !, whereas c
A
! increases with v! + c!. It follows that
expression (6) is higher in environment A. Therefore, the rms expected prot from
P is higher in environment A.
The intuition for this result - as in the two-state example - is that when the rm
contemplates a small change in the price in some state, it is mindful of the implications
of this price change for the loss aversion term in other states associated with higher
prices. When uctuations are in demand, the mark-up in those high-price states is
higher than when uctuations are in cost, and therefore the incentive to shrink the gap
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between the high and low prices is stronger.
6 Discussion
This section is divided into two parts. First, I conduct a detailed comparison between
the model presented here and the original HKR model. Second, I briey discuss an
extension in which consumers have a taste for pleasant price surprises.
6.1 Comparison with HKR
As explained in the Introduction, the model presented in this paper shares the economic
motivation and basic modelling idea with HK, yet it departs from their model in three
dimensions.
Which aspects of the market outcome are relevant for loss aversion?
In the HKR model, consumers display loss aversion both in the price dimension and in
the consumption quantity dimension. The former captures the distaste for unpleasant
price surprises, which is the focus of this paper. The latter, however, captures a
distinct phenomenon, which is close both formally and psychologically to the well-
known endowment e¤ect: the consumer experiences a disutility if his consumption
quantity is lower than expected.
The fact that both e¤ects can be classied as instances of loss aversion attests to
the power and generality of loss aversion as a theoretical construct. However, this
does not change the fact that the two e¤ects are distinct, and they may be relevant in
di¤erent contexts. For instance, a sense of ownership seems more pertinent to durable
goods than to perishable goods, and therefore I expect loss aversion in the consumption
quantity dimension to be more relevant in the former case. Since we should not expect
the two e¤ects to be equally applicable to a given market situation, I see no obvious
reason for incorporating both of them into the same model. As it happens, the two
e¤ects have contradictory pricing implications: distaste for price surprises leads to price
rigidity, whereas the attachment e¤ect may give the rm an incentive to randomize over
prices. Thus, focusing on one of the e¤ects while ignoring the other also makes it easier
to obtain clear-cut results.
Does the consumers expected action enter the specication of the reference point?
HKR assume that the consumers reference point takes into account his own expec-
tation of his own consumption decision. The consumers decision is thus a personal
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equilibrium: the action he chooses maximizes the consumers reference-dependent
utility given the reference point induced by the very same action. In our context, this
means that the consumers reference price is not the price he expects the rm to charge,
but the price he expects to end up paying. In particular, if he expects not to buy the
product, then an unpleasant price surprise does not generate a loss.
How should we sum overmultiple reference points?
The original specication of Prospect Theory assumed a single reference point. It is
not clear how one should extend the model when there are multiple candidates for a
reference point. A market environment with stochastic prices naturally generates a big
set of possible outcomes that can act as reference points. HKR assume that the decision
maker sums over them as follows. He computes his reference-dependent expected
utility from a given action for any possible reference point r, and then integrates over
all values of r to obtain his evaluation of the action.
The di¢ culty with this procedure is that it is hard to think of a concrete scenario
that generates it. In addition, the procedure presumes that the consumer is aware
of all possible reference points and nevertheless allows each of them to inuence his
evaluation of each action. I believe, however, that reference points are powerful when
they are salient; the greater the number of possible reference points the decision maker
is aware of, the lower the likelihood that his behavior will be sensitive to any of them.
Of course, this is only my opinion and it is debatable.
The reason for my rst two departures is clear: one can fruitfully analyze con-
sumersaversion to unpleasant price surprises and its implications for price rigidity,
without entering the complications that arise when we (1) introduce loss aversion into
the consumers evaluation of other aspects of the market outcome, and (2) allow the
consumers expectation of his own consumption decision to enter the specication of
the reference point. In this sense, the model in this paper is a simplication of HKR,
which is therefore useful for pedagogical purposes and for certain applications.
The third departure from HKR is a modication of their model of the formation
of reference points. One advantage of the sampling-basedmodel of reference-point
formation is that it is based on a concrete scenario that describes how each consumer
gets to form his reference point: the consumer observes (directly or through word
of mouth) one past market outcome and this becomes his reference point. Another
advantage is that the resulting model of consumer choice treats the reference point as if
it were a consumer type. To obtain aggregate consumer demand, we simply integrate
over all possible reference points, just as we integrate over all possible standard
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preference types. The di¤erence is that the distribution of reference points, unlike the
distribution of preference types, is inuenced by the rms strategy.
6.2 Pleasant Price Surprises4
Throughout this paper, we assumed that consumerswillingness to pay reacts only to
unpleasant surprises - i.e. cases in which the actual price exceeds the expected price.
One could argue that in many real-life situations, consumerswillingness to pay also
reacts to pleasant surprises. For instance, they may have a taste for bargains. when a
consumer encounters a price that is lower than expected, he may view it as a bargain
and this may spuriously enhance his willingness.
Consider the following simple version of our model. The rms marginal cost is
c = 0 with certainty. The consumers rawwillingness to pay is u = 1 with certainty.
The rm can employ a random pricing strategy - namely, a lottery  over prices. In
this case, the consumers reference point is pe with probability (pe). Let g; l  0.
The consumer is willing to buy the product at a price p if p  v + g  (pe   p) when
p < pe, and if p  v   l  (p   pe) when p > pe. Thus, the consumers willingness to
purchase is a¤ected by both pleasant and unpleasant surprises.
If g = l = 0, the rms optimal pricing strategy is p = 1. If g = 0 and l > 0,
we are back with our original model (except that c and u are deterministic). The rm
has a strict disincentive to randomize over prices in this case. To see why, observe
that the consumers willingness to pay cannot exceed one. If the rm assigns positive
probability to prices above one, the consumer never buys at those prices, while if the
rm assigns positive probability to prices below one, it earns by denition less than
one (and in addition, the consumer may fail to buy the product, because even if p < 1,
it is not necessarily the lowest price in the support of the price distribution, and can
therefore constitute an unpleasant surprise that reduces the consumers willingness to
pay).
Now suppose that g > 0, and consider a random pricing strategy that assigns
probability  to p1 and probability 1   to p2, where p1 and p2 satisfy
p2 > p1 > 4
1 + g  (p2   p1) > p1
4This sub-section is based on a suggestion by Kr Eliaz.
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Then, the rms expected prot is
  p1  [  0 + (1  )  1] + (1  )  p2  0 = (1  )p1
Thus, since p1 > 4, the rms expected prot exceeds the level it can reach without
randomization. Note that since there are only two price levels in the support of the
price distribution, and since both price levels exceed the consumers raw willingness to
pay, the consumers loss aversion parameter l is irrelevant. The consumer experiences
a loss when the expected price is p1 and the actual price is p2. But since p2 exceeds
the consumers rawwillingness to pay, he would not buy the product at this price
even if we set the loss aversion parameter to l = 0.
The feature in this example that gives the rm a strict incentive to randomize is
that the high price p2 can be arbitrarily high, such that the contribution of the pleasant
surprise to the consumers willingness to pay is unbounded. However, the consumer
does not buy the product at p2. One could argue that prices that lead to no trade
should not serve as reference points. This criticism makes sense if the sampling process
that generates the reference points is based on actual transaction prices rather than
stated prices. This would be in the spirit of the HKR assumption that the consumers
reference point incorporates his expectation regarding his own consumption decision.
If we accepted this critique, then the rationale for randomization in this example would
disappear.
7 Conclusion
My aim in this paper was to conduct a re-modelling exercise which I referred to as a
cover versionof the HKRmodel. Hopefully, the variation analyzed here contributes a
di¤erent way of looking at the notion of reference-dependent consumer preferences. Its
usefulness was demonstrated with a pair of novel results, concerning the impact of loss
aversion on expected price and the di¤erence between cost and demand uctuations.
An important ingredient in the HKR model, namely the notion of personal equilibrium,
has been suppressed, because it is not needed in order to capture the implications of
loss aversion for price rigidity. Combining such a notion with the sampling-based
method of aggregating reference points is left for future research. See Spiegler (2010)
for a proposal for such an extended model.
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